

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 089099
ORIGIN ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 SS-15 SSO-00 USIE-00
INRE-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 PM-04 INR-07 L-03
NSAE-00 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 TRSE-00 OES-06 ERDA-05
NRC-05 MC-02 /092 R

DRAFTED BY ACDA/IR:MCONGDON
APPROVED BY ACDA/IR:WSTEARMAN
PM/DCA:LBRECKON
ACDA/IR:CCFLOWERREE
S/P:THIRSCHFELD
EUR/RPM:JHAWES
OSD/ISA:GHARLOW
EUR/SOV:JGLASSMAN
ACDA/GC:MMAZEAU

-----210254Z 033230 /75

O R 202201Z APR 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
CIA
NSC
DOD

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 089099

E.O. 11652:

TAGS: NATO, PFOR, PARM

SUBJECT: NATO DISARMAMENT EXPERTS APRIL 21-22:
INSTRUCTIONS FOR USDEL

REF: USNATO 1134

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 089099

1.FOLLOWING ARE INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE US REPRESENTATIVE
TO THE NATO DISARMAMENT EXPERTS,SPRING 1977 MEETING.
TALKING POINTS ARE ARRANGED ACCORDING TO AGENDA ITEMS
AS LISTED REFTEL:

BEGIN TEXT:

CONTENTS.....

I.PREPARATIONS FOR THE U.N. SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

II.TEST BAN ISSUES WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE CTB

III.SEABED TREATY ISSUES

IV. CHEMICAL WEAPONS

V. HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS: (WEAPONS CAUSING UNNECESSARY SUFFERING OR HAVING INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS)

VI.NEW WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

VII.REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS

VIII.REGIONAL ASPECTS OF DISARMAMENT (CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS)

I.U.N. SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

A. FIRST PREPCOM MEETING

-- WE ARE GENERALLY SATISFIED WITH THE OUTCOME OF THE FIRST PREPCOM MEETING, IN TERMS OF ITS ORGANIZATIONAL DECISIONS AND OF THE BUSINESSLIKE ATMOSPHERE THAT PREVAILED, THE LACK OF CONFRONTATION AND POSTURING, AND THE EFFICIENT CHAIRMANSHIP OF ORTIZ DE ROZAS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 089099

-- WE ARE HAPPY THAT NORWAY IS A MEMBER OF THE BUREAU.

-- WE CONSIDER THE DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURE APPROVED AT THE MEETING ACCEPTABLE, THOUGH IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN OUR STRESS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF ENSURING THE BROADEST POSSIBLE AGREEMENT IF THE SESSION IS TO BE A SUCCESS.

-- WHILE WE WERE PREPARED TO CONSIDER MORE FORTHCOMING POSSIBILITIES FOR FACILITATING NGO CONTRIBUTIONS, WE HAVE NO OBJECTIONS TO THE FORMULA WORKED OUT BY THE BUREAU AND ORTIZ.

B. U.S. APPROACH AND APRIL 15 SUBMISSION

-- OUR RESPONSE TO THE SYG STRESSES THE THEME THAT THE SPECIAL SESSION SHOULD, AS ITS KEY PURPOSE, SEEK TO GIVE A GENUINE IMPETUS TO PRODUCTIVE ARMS CONTROL AND

DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS.

-- IT DOES NOT REJECT THE IDEA OF SEEKING AGREEMENT ON PRIORITIES, PRINCIPLES, OR A PROGRAM OF ACTION, BUT EXPRESSES OUR DOUBTS ABOUT THE REAL VALUE OF SUCH EXERCISES.

-- THE PAPER DOES NOT PROPOSE ANY SPECIFIC SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION AT THE SESSION; WE HAVE NOT YET DECIDED WHAT ISSUES COULD USEFULLY BE PROMOTED.

-- WE EXPRESSED OUR FLEXIBILITY ON THE QUESTION OF THE AGENDA, WHICH INDICATED WE WOULD PREFER AN ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK (I.E., "GENERAL DEBATE," "ADOPTION OF FINAL DOCUMENTS") RATHER THAN A THEMATIC ONE (I.E., "PRINCIPLES," "PROGRAM OF ACTION," "IMPROVEMENT OF MACHINERY").

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 089099

-- WE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THE SESSION SHOULD BE PREPARED TO IMPROVE EXISTING MECHANISMS WHERE NECESSARY AND TO LAUNCH NEW EFFORTS (E.G., REGIONAL CONFERENCES) WHERE DESIRABLE.

-- OVERALL, THE PAPER TAKES A FAIRLY PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH, PRESERVING OUR FLEXIBILITY TO GAUGE PROSPECTS FOR SPECIFIC PROJECTS AS THE PREPARATORY PROCESS MATURES.

C. IF NON ALIGNED INFORMATION PAPER IS DISCUSSED

-- THE "INFORMATION PAPER" FOR NONALIGNED DELEGATIONS PREPARED IN NEW YORK SUGGESTS THE DIMENSIONS OF THE AMBITIONS OF KEY NONALIGNED COUNTRIES.

-- BUT THE PAPER RAISES MANY PROBLEMS; AMONG THEM:

A. THE PROMINENCE ACCORDED TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW "PRINCIPLES" OF DISARMAMENT;

B. THE EXTENSIVE LIST OF SPECIFIC MEASURES TO BE "URGENTLY IMPLEMENTED," MANY OF WHICH ARE CLEARLY UNREALISTIC;

C. THE ABSENCE OF ANY POSITIVE REFERENCE TO THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS PROBLEM (ALTHOUGH THERE IS AN INTERESTING SUGGESTION OF CONSIDERING REGIONAL CONFERENCES ON ARMS LIMITATION);

D. THE COMPLETE LACK OF BALANCE BETWEEN "VERTICAL"

PROLIFERATION ISSUES (WHICH ARE NUMEROUS) AND HORIZONTAL
PROLIFERATION (WHICH IS TOTALLY IGNORED);

E. THE INCLUSION (AND IMPLICIT ENDORSEMENT) OF SOVIET
PROJECTS, INCLUDING MDW, NUF, AND WDC; ON WDC, THE PAPER
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 089099

SUGGESTS THAT THE NONALIGNED ARE BECOMING MORE WILLING
TO ACCEPT THE IDEA OF A LINKAGE BETWEEN THE SSOD AND THE
CONVENING OF A WDC;

F. THE IDEA OF ESTABLISHING AN "ORGANIC LINK" BETWEEN
THE CCD AND THE UNGA.

-- THE PAPER HAS, ON THE OTHER HAND, SOME ENCOURAGING
SIGNS OF PRAGMATISM, (FOR EXAMPLE, RECOGNITION THAT
DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS CANNOT BE CONCLUDED AT THE SESSION;
OMISSION OF THE IDEA OF A SCHEDULE FOR A DISARMAMENT
PROGRAM.)

-- IT ALSO SHOWS SIGNS OF RESTRAINT (FOR EXAMPLE, IN
THE RELATIVELY MODEST LANGUAGE DEALING WITH THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, WHICH
AVOIDS MECHANISTIC FORMULATIONS AND MAKES NO REFERENCE
TO THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER; IN THE SECTIONS
DEALING WITH POSSIBLE CHANGES IN UN MACHINERY, SUCH AS
THE UNDC AND THE SECRETARIAT.)

II. COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

-- THE UNITED STATES IS DEEPLY COMMITTED TO NEGOTIATING
AND CONCLUDING A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN. WE HAVE DECIDED
TO PROCEED WITH EARLY DISCUSSIONS, INITIALLY WITH THE
SOVIET UNION, AIMED AT ESTABLISHING COMMON GROUND FOR
MOVING TO MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS IN THE CCD.

-- THE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTIONS TO BE RESOLVED
CONCERN VERIFICATION, PNES, PARTICIPATION, AND A
MORATORIUM. THESE WILL BE EXPLORED IN OUR DISCUSSIONS.
OUR POSITION ON THESE ISSUES IS CURRENTLY BEING EXAMINED
BY THE PRESIDENT, SO I CANNOT BE AS EXPLICIT ABOUT
IT AS I WOULD LIKE TO BE. THERE IS, HOWEVER, GENERAL
AGREEMENT IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT THAT ANY CTB MUST
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 089099

BAN NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES.

-- WE ARE CONVINCED THAT A TRULY COMPREHENSIVE, AND ADEQUATELY VERIFIED CTB WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY OF ALL PARTICIPANTS, AND TO GLOBAL SECURITY, IN THAT IT WOULD HELP TO LIMIT THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER QUALITATIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE WHICH MIGHT BE DESTABILIZING, AND WOULD ALSO GREATLY ENHANCE THE GOAL OF HALTING THE HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

III. SEABEDS ARMS CONTROL TREATY REVIEW CONFERENCE

-- THE USG BELIEVES THAT THE SEABED TREATY HAS FUNCTIONED EFFECTIVELY, AND ANTICIPATES THAT THE REVCON WILL COME TO THE SAME CONCLUSION.

-- SINCE THERE HAS NOT BEEN AND THERE IS LITTLE PROSPECT OF AN ARMS RACE ON THE SEABED AND BECAUSE SOME SEABED SYSTEMS ARE BEING TREATED IN SALT, THERE IS NO NEED TO CONCLUDE FURTHER ARMS CONTROL INSTRUMENTS IN RELATION TO THE SEABEDS, OR TO EXPAND THE SCOPE OF THE PRESENT TREATY.

-- THUS, WE SEE NO NEED TO AMEND THE TREATY AT THIS TIME. WE ARE, HOWEVER, PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY REASONABLE PROPOSALS, AND TO DISCUSS THE BEST WAY OF DEALING WITH THEM. IF ANY PARTIES HAVE SERIOUS PROPOSALS TO RAISE AT THE REVCON, IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR THEM TO GIVE AS MUCH ADVANCE NOTICE AS POSSIBLE.

-- THE USG WOULD LIKE TO ENSURE THAT LAW OF THE SEA ISSUES DO NOT INTRUDE INTO THE SEABED REVCON, AND THAT THE REVIEW PROCESS IS CARRIED OUT IN A BUSINESSLIKE AND ORDERLY WAY.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 07 STATE 089099

-- WE WOULD HOPE THAT FUTURE SEABED REVCONS WOULD ONLY BE HELD WHEN A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PARTIES CONSIDER SUCH A REVIEW NECESSARY. HOWEVER, IF THERE IS A STRONG DESIRE FOR A FIXED INTERVAL, WE WOULD PREFER A TEN YEAR PERIOD BETWEEN REVIEW CONFERENCES, AND CERTAINLY NO LESS THAN FIVE YEARS.

IV. CHEMICAL WEAPONS

-- THE U.S. IS CURRENTLY REVIEWING CW ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. WE EXPECT THIS REVIEW TO BE COMPLETED IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND, AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES, POSSIBLY TO PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A PROPOSAL TO THE

U.S.S.R.

-- A SECOND ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS AT THE EXPERT LEVEL ON CW WAS HELD WITH THE RUSSIANS IN GENEVA DURING THE PERIOD APRIL 1 - APRIL 8. THESE CONSULTATIONS WERE PURSUANT TO THE AGREEMENT TO CONSIDER A JOINT INITIATIVE REACHED AT THE JULY 1974 SUMMIT, BUT THE US DEL WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS ON A TREATY. THE SOVIETS ARE CLEARLY IMPATIENT AND APPEAR ANXIOUS TO BEGIN PREPARING A JOINT INITIATIVE. THE TONE OF THE CONSULTATIONS WAS COURTEOUS AND BUSINESSLIKE.

-- THE CONSULTATIONS FOCUSED ON TECHNICAL QUESTIONS RELATED TO CW ARMS CONTROL, PARTICULARLY IN THE AREAS OF SCOPE OF PROHIBITION AND OF VERIFICATION. IN THIS RESPECT THE CONSULTATIONS REPRESENTED AN EXTENSION OF THE FIRST ROUND, WHICH WAS HELD IN AUGUST 1976.

-- LITTLE NEW GROUND WAS BROKEN IN THE CONSULTATIONS. BECAUSE OUR REVIEW HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETED, THE U.S. WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO PRESENT A PROPOSAL. FOR THEIR PART, THE SOVIETS REITERATED THEIR WELL-KNOWN VIEWS ON VERIFICATION AND MAINTAINED THEIR NEGATIVE POSITION
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 08 STATE 089099

ON TECHNICAL EXCHANGE VISITS. OVERALL, PROGRESS WAS SLIGHT.

-- DURING THE CONSULTATIONS, THE U.S. SUGGESTED THAT ANY JOINT INITIATIVE TAKE THE FORM OF AGREED KEY ELEMENTS OF A CW AGREEMENT, RATHER THAN A DRAFT TREATY TEXT.(IF ASKED: THE PRELIMINARY REACTION OF THE SOVIET SIDE WAS THAT WHILE A FULL TREATY TEXT WAS NOT NECESSARILY REQUIRED, THEY PREFERRED TO HAVE THE KEY ELEMENTS IN TREATY LANGUAGE.)

-- IT WAS AGREED TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSIONS, ALTHOUGH NO DATE WAS SET. WE HAVE INDICATED TO THE SOVIETS THAT FURTHER DISCUSSIONS COULD BE HELD BEFORE THE CCD SUMMER SESSION, WHICH BEGINS JULY 5. THIS WILL HOWEVER DEPEND UPON THE STATE OF OUR REVIEW AND SUBSEQUENT CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES.

-- DURING SECRETARY VANCE'S RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW, IT WAS AGREED TO ESTABLISH A U.S. - SOVIET WORKING GROUP ON CW. NO DECISION HAS YET BEEN MADE ON HOW TO PROCEED WITH THIS GROUP, ALTHOUGH IT IS LIKELY THAT THIS GROUP WILL PROVIDE THE FORUM FOR CONTINUATION OF THE BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ALREADY UNDERWAY.

V. HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS (WEAPONS CAUSING UNNECESSARY SUFFERING OR HAVING INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS)

-- THE USG IS PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE'S AD HOC COMMITTEE ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ISSUES. HOWEVER, WE NOTE THAT ALL THE MAJOR POWERS ARE OPPOSED TO ANY ATTEMPT TO REACH AGREEMENT ON WEAPONS ISSUES IN THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE. FURTHER, THE COMMITTEE'S WORK SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO INTERFERE WITH THE HIGHER-PRIORITY WORK OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE COMPLETION OF THE TWO DRAFT PROTOCOLS TO THE 1949 GENEVA CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 09 STATE 089099

CONVENTIONS. IN ANY EVENT, WE DOUBT THERE IS SUFFICIENT TIME TO RESOLVE THE SUBSTANTIAL DIVERGENCE OF VIEWS AMONG CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS. HENCE, ALTHOUGH WE EXPECT THAT SOME OF THE NONALIGNED DELEGATIONS WILL PRESS FOR ADOPTION OF THEIR WEAPONS PROPOSALS DURING THIS SESSION OF THE LAWS OF WAR CONFERENCE, WE BELIEVE IT UNLIKELY THAT THESE PROPOSALS WILL BE ACTED UPON.

-- WE THEREFORE ANTICIPATE THAT THE ONLY RESULT OF THE CONFERENCE ON THESE QUESTIONS WILL BE A REPORT NOTING THE AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT, WHICH WILL BE FORWARDED TO GOVERNMENTS AND THE UNGA FOR CONSIDERATION OF FUTURE ACTION. WE WOULD SUPPORT THIS.

-- ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE VARIOUS PROPOSALS FOR WEAPONS RESTRICTIONS, THE US POSITION HAS NOT CHANGED SIGNIFICANTLY SINCE THE 3RD SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE. THE USG SUPPORTS REASONABLE RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF MINES AND BOOBY-TRAPS, ON THE USE OF INCENDIARY MUNITIONS IN POPULATED AREAS, AND ON MUNITIONS WHICH RELY FOR THEIR WOUNDING EFFECT ON NON-X-RAY DETECTABLE FRAGMENTS, BUT OPPOSES THE BROAD PROHIBITIONS PROPOSED BY THE SWEDES AND THE NON-ALIGNED.

-- WE HAVE AGREED TO THE MANDATE FOR A NATO STAFF STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF THE PROVISIONS ON MEANS AND METHODS OF WARFARE AND PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS CONTAINED IN PARTS III AND IV OF LOW DRAFT PROTOCOL I. HOWEVER, AS WE STATED IN POLADS ON APRIL 5, WE CONSIDER THE AUGUST 31 TARGET DATE FOR COMPLETION OF THE STUDY TO BE TENTATIVE, SUBJECT TO RECONSIDERATION ONCE THE LOW CONFERENCE CONCLUDES ITS WORK IN JUNE.

VI. NEW WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

-- WE RECOGNIZE THE DANGERS POSED BY WEAPONS OF CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 10 STATE 089099

MASS DESTRUCTION - EITHER NEW OR EXISTING - AND WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY PRACTICAL STEPS TOWARD OVERCOMING SUCH DANGERS.

-- IN DISCUSSIONS OF NEW MDW IT IS ESSENTIAL TO MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS (FOR EXAMPLE THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION).

-- THE SOVIET APPROACH IS STILL A SINGLE, COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT PROHIBITING "NEW TYPES" AND "NEW SYSTEMS" OF MDW. WE BELIEVE EXPERIENCE SUGGESTS THAT DIVERSE NEW TYPES AND SYSTEMS OF WEAPONS WOULD REQUIRE SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO DEFINITION, SCOPE AND VERIFICATION, AND, THEREFORE, PROBABLY DISTINCT AGREEMENTS.

-- WE HAVE ENCOURAGED ACCEPTANCE OF THE 1948 UN DEFINITION OF MDW IN ORDER TO IMPOSE ON DISCUSSIONS THE 1948 COMPARABILITY STANDARD AS A BASIS FOR IDENTIFYING ANY NEW CANDIDATE WEAPON TYPE AS A WEAPON OF MASS DESTRUCTION. (NOTE: THE 1948 FORMULATION IS THAT AN MDW MUST, "HAVE CHARACTERISTICS COMPARABLE IN

DESTRUCTIVE EFFECT TO THOSE OF ATOMIC EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS, RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL WEAPONS, LETHAL CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.")

-- WE HAVE AGREED WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO SET UP A WORKING GROUP ON RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (WHICH WE DO NOT HAVE). THE SOVIETS ASSOCIATE THIS TOPIC WITH THE CONCEPT OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. WE HAVE NOT YET REACHED AGREEMENT ON WHEN THIS WORKING GROUP WILL MEET.

VII. REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS

-- THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERS THE 1976 REPORT OF
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 11 STATE 089099

THE UNSYG'S BUDGETARY EXPERTS GROUP TO BE A CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE REPORTING STANDARDS.

-- STANDARDIZED REPORTING OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES BY ALL NATIONS WOULD ENHANCE INTERNATIONAL CONFIDENCE AND WOULD REDUCE SECURITY FEARS.

-- THE METHODS OUTLINED IN THE STUDY FOCUS ATTENTION ON THE PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF THE QUESTION, WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAS SO FAR BEEN UNWILLING TO ADDRESS. WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE SOVIETS PARTICIPATE AND WILL CONTINUE TO URGE THEM TO DO SO.

-- DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE USE OF RESOURCES DERIVING FROM A MILITARY BUDGET AGREEMENT SHOULD AWAIT THE PREPARATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A UNIVERSAL, STANDARDIZED REPORTING SYSTEM WHICH CAN BE WORKED OUT IN THE PROCESS OF OPERATIONAL TESTING AND REFINEMENT.

-- SINCE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT IS LIKELY TO BE A MAJOR TOPIC AT THE SSOD, THE WESTERN ALLIES SHOULD FORMULATE A STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH IT. WE LOOK FAVORABLY ON THE OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF FORMULATIONS REGARDING REDUCTIONS OF MILITARY BUDGETS, BUT WE ARE OPPOSED TO A MECHANICAL LINKAGE BETWEEN SUCH REDUCTIONS AND INCREASES IN DEVELOPMENT AID.

VIII. REGIONAL ASPECTS OF DISARMAMENT: CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS

-- PRESIDENT CARTER HAS EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF BRINGING ABOUT A REDUCTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 12 STATE 089099

-- THE FIRST STEP IN THIS PROCESS INVOLVES THE DEVELOPMENT OF GREATER RESTRAINTS ON US ARMS EXPORT POLICY.

-- THE NEXT STEP WILL INVOLVE AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR BETTER CONTROL OF THE WORLD ARMS TRADE.

-- AT THE PRESIDENT'S DIRECTION A REVIEW OF US ARMS TRANSFER POLICY HAS RECENTLY BEEN COMPLETED AS A BASIS FOR PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS.

-- WE WILL BE DISCUSSING WITH ARMS SUPPLIERS AND RECIPIENTS ANY NEW POLICIES ENUNCIATED BY THE PRESIDENT.

-- AS A RESULT OF SECRETARY VANCE'S TRIP TO MOSCOW, A US-SOVIET WORKING GROUP ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS SALES WILL BE ESTABLISHED.

-- WE WANT TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH YOU ON THE QUESTION OF ARMS TRANSFER CONTROLS.

-- WE WOULD WELCOME SUGGESTIONS ON APPROPRIATE FORUMS AND APPROACHES.

-- OF PARTICULAR INTEREST WOULD BE YOUR VIEWS ON:

A. THE MERITS OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OR REGIONAL CONFERENCES DEVOTED SOLELY TO THE SUBJECT;

B. PERTINENT AREAS FOR COOPERATION WITHIN NATO;

C. OTHER APPROACHES TO SUPPLIER COOPERATION;

C. HOW THE USSR MIGHT BEST BE BROUGHT INTO ARMS SUPPLY RESTRAINT ARRANGEMENTS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 13 STATE 089099

-- WE ARE AWARE OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN ARMS TRANSFER RESTRAINT. WHAT TYPES OF ARMS PRODUCTION AND MARKETING ARRANGEMENTS MIGHT INDUCE GREATER COOPERATION AMONG ARMS SUPPLIER STATES?

-- THE COOPERATION OF ARMS RECIPIENTS WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO BE SOUGHT TO AVOID CHARGES OF DISCRIMINATION BY THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES. WHAT INCENTIVES MIGHT SUPPLIERS PROVIDE TO INDUCE RECIPIENTS TO REACH AGREEMENTS TO LIMIT THEIR ARMS IMPORTS ON A REGIONAL OR SUB-REGIONAL BASIS?

-- WE WOULD ALSO BE INTERESTED IN FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE BELGIAN PROPOSAL FOR A STUDY OF THE REGIONAL ASPECTS OF ARMS CONTROL.

IX. "OTHER BUSINESS," SOVIET PROPOSAL ON NON-USE OF FORCE

-- OUR VIEWS ON THE SOVIET NON-USE OF FORCE PROPOSAL HAVE NOT CHANGED SINCE LAST FALL'S UNGA SESSION. IT IS OUR OPINION THAT A NUF TREATY WOULD UNDERMINE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS, AND THAT ANY MODIFICATIONS OF THE UN CHARTER SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN PURSUANT TO THE AMENDMENT PROCEDURE PROVIDED THEREIN.

-- ORAL SOVIET ASSERTIONS THAT A NUF TREATY WOULD NOT PERTAIN TO LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND WOULD NOT RESTRICT THE RIGHT OF GOVERNMENTS TO RECOVER CONQUERED TERRITORIES BY FORCE, COULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF LEGITIMIZING CERTAIN ILLEGITIMATE USES OF FORCE IN

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

-- INSTEAD OF A FURTHER GLOSS ON THE PROHIBITION OF
THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, WHAT IS NEEDED IS GREATER
WILL ON THE PART OF STATES TO HONOR EXISTING OBLIGATIONS,
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 14 STATE 089099

AS WELL AS GREATER COMMITMENT TO THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
OF DISPUTES.

-- ALTHOUGH WE DOUBT THAT THE SOVIETS CAN BE PERSUADED
TO FORGO PLENARY AND FIRST COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION OF THEIR
PROPOSAL IN THIS FALL'S UNGA, THE WESTERN COUNTRIES
SHOULD TRY TO ENSURE THAT IT GETS A THOROUGH AIRING
IN THE SIXTH COMMITTEE, RESULTING IN A DETAILED
EXAMINATION OF ITS LEGAL IMPLICATIONS. END TEXT.
VANCE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 089099
ORIGIN ACDA-04

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /005 R

66011

DRAFTED BY:ACDA/IR:NWALDROP

APPROVED BY:ACDA/IR:WSTEARMAN

ACDA/IR:CCFLOWERREE

-----280730Z 024331 /21

R 280035Z APR 77

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 089099

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 089099 ACTION NATO INFO GENEVA
USUN NEW YORK CIA NSC DOD 20 APR 77

QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 089099

E.O. 11652:

TAGS: NATO, PFOR, PARM

SUBJECT: NATO DISARMAMENT EXPERTS APRIL 21-22:
INSTRUCTIONS FOR USDEL

EF: USNATO 1134

. FOLLOWING ARE INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE US REPRESENTATIVE
O THE NATO DISARMAMENT EXPERTS, SPRING 1977 MEETING.
ALKING POINTS ARE ARRANGED ACCORDING TO AGENDA ITEMS
S LISTED REFTEL:

EGIN TEXT:
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 089099

ONTENTS

. PREPARATIONS FOR THE U.N. SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

I. TEST BAN ISSUES WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE CTB

II. SEABED TREATY ISSUES

V. CHEMICAL WEAPONS

V. HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS: (WEAPONS CAUSING
UNNECESSARY SUFFERING OR HAVING INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS)

I. NEW WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

II. REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS

III. REGIONAL ASPECTS OF DISARMAMENT (CONVENTIONAL ARMS
TRANSFERS)

. U.N. SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

A. FIRST PREPCOM MEETING

-- WE ARE GENERALLY SATISFIED WITH THE OUTCOME OF THE
FIRST PREPCOM MEETING, IN TERMS OF ITS ORGANIZATIONAL
DECISIONS AND OF THE BUSINESSLIKE ATMOSPHERE THAT PRE-
VAILED, THE LACK OF CONFRONTATION AND POSTURING, AND
THE EFFICIENT CHAIRMANSHIP OF ORTIZ DE ROZAS.

-- WE ARE HAPPY THAT NORWAY IS A MEMBER OF THE BUREAU.

-- WE CONSIDER THE DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURE APPROVED AT THE MEETING ACCEPTABLE, THOUGH IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN OUR STRESS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF ENSURING CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 089099

THE BROADEST POSSIBLE AGREEMENT IF THE SESSION IS TO BE A SUCCESS.

-- WHILE WE WERE PREPARED TO CONSIDER MORE FORTHCOMING POSSIBILITIES FOR FACILITATING NGO CONTRIBUTIONS, WE HAVE NO OBJECTIONS TO THE FORMULA WORKED OUT BY THE BUREAU AND ORTIZ.

B. U.S. APPROACH AND APRIL 15 SUBMISSION

-- OUR RESPONSE TO THE SYG STRESSES THE THEME THAT THE SPECIAL SESSION SHOULD, AS ITS KEY PURPOSE, SEEK TO GIVE A GENUINE IMPETUS TO PRODUCTIVE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS.

-- IT DOES NOT REJECT THE IDEA OF SEEKING AGREEMENT ON PRIORITIES, PRINCIPLES, OR A PROGRAM OF ACTION, BUT EXPRESSES OUR DOUBTS ABOUT THE REAL VALUE OF SUCH EXERCISES.

-- THE PAPER DOES NOT PROPOSE ANY SPECIFIC SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION AT THE SESSION; WE HAVE NOT YET DECIDED WHAT ISSUES COULD USEFULLY BE PROMOTED.

-- WE EXPRESSED OUR FLEXIBILITY ON THE QUESTION OF THE AGENDA, WHICH INDICATED WE WOULD PREFER AN ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK (I.E., "GENERAL DEBATE," "ADOPTION OF FINAL DOCUMENTS") RATHER THAN A THEMATIC ONE (I.E., "PRINCIPLES," "PROGRAM OF ACTION," "IMPROVEMENT OF MACHINERY").

-- WE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THE SESSION SHOULD BE PREPARED TO IMPROVE EXISTING MECHANISMS WHERE NECESSARY AND TO LAUNCH NEW EFFORTS (E.G., REGIONAL CONFERENCES) WHERE DESIRABLE.

-- OVERALL, THE PAPER TAKES A FAIRLY PHILOSOPHICAL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 089099

APPROACH, PRESERVING OUR FLEXIBILITY TO GAUGE PROSPECTS FOR SPECIFIC PROJECTS AS THE PREPARATORY PROCESS

MATURES.

C. IF NON ALIGNED INFORMATION PAPER IS DISCUSSED

-- THE "INFORMATION PAPER" FOR NONALIGNED DELEGATIONS PREPARED IN NEW YORK SUGGESTS THE DIMENSIONS OF THE AMBITIONS OF KEY NONALIGNED COUNTRIES.

-- BUT THE PAPER RAISES MANY PROBLEMS; AMONG THEM:

A. THE PROMINENCE ACCORDED TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF

NEW "PRINCIPLES" OF DISARMAMENT;

B. THE EXTENSIVE LIST OF SPECIFIC MEASURES TO BE "URGENTLY IMPLEMENTED," MANY OF WHICH ARE CLEARLY UNREALISTIC;

N

C. THE ABSENCE OF ANY POSITIVE REFERENCE TO THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS PROBLEM (ALTHOUGH THERE IS AN INTERESTING SUGGESTION OF CONSIDERING REGIONAL CONFERENCES ON ARMS LIMITATION);

D. THE COMPLETE LACK OF BALANCE BETWEEN "VERTICAL" PROLIFERATION ISSUES (WHICH ARE NUMEROUS) AND HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION (WHICH IS TOTALLY IGNORED);

E. THE INCLUSION (AND IMPLICIT ENDORSEMENT) OF SOVIET PROJECTS, INCLUDING MDW, NUF, AND WDC; ON WDC, THE PAPER SUGGESTS THAT THE NONALIGNED ARE BECOMING MORE WILLING TO ACCEPT THE IDEA OF A LINKAGE BETWEEN THE SSOD AND THE CONVENING OF A WDC;

F. THE IDEA OF ESTABLISHING AN "ORGANIC LINK" BETWEEN
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 089099

THE CCD AND THE UNGA.

-- THE PAPER HAS, ON THE OTHER HAND, SOME ENCOURAGING SIGNS OF PRAGMATISM, (FOR EXAMPLE, RECOGNITION THAT DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS CANNOT BE CONCLUDED AT THE SESSION; OMISSION OF THE IDEA OF A SCHEDULE FOR A DISARMAMENT PROGRAM.)

-- IT ALSO SHOWS SIGNS OF RESTRAINT (FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE RELATIVELY MODEST LANGUAGE DEALING WITH THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, WHICH AVOIDS MECHANISTIC FORMULATIONS AND MAKES NO REFERENCE TO THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER; IN THE SECTIONS DEALING WITH POSSIBLE CHANGES IN UN MACHINERY, SUCH AS

THE UNDC AND THE SECRETARIAT.)

II. COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

-- THE UNITED STATES IS DEEPLY COMMITTED TO NEGOTIATING AND CONCLUDING A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN. WE HAVE DECIDED TO PROCEED WITH EARLY DISCUSSIONS, INITIALLY WITH THE SOVIET UNION, AIMED AT ESTABLISHING COMMON GROUND FOR MOVING TO MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS IN THE CCD.

-- THE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTIONS TO BE RESOLVED CONCERN VERIFICATION, PNES, PARTICIPATION, AND A MORATORIUM. THESE WILL BE EXPLORED IN OUR DISCUSSIONS. OUR POSITION ON THESE ISSUES IS CURRENTLY BEING EXAMINED BY THE PRESIDENT, SO I CANNOT BE AS EXPLICIT ABOUT IT AS I WOULD LIKE TO BE. THERE IS, HOWEVER, GENERAL AGREEMENT IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT THAT ANY CTB MUST BAN NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES.

-- WE ARE CONVINCED THAT A TRULY COMPREHENSIVE, AND ADEQUATELY VERIFIED CTB WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY OF ALL PARTICIPANTS, AND TO GLOBAL SECURITY, IN THAT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 089099

IT WOULD HELP TO LIMIT THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER QUALITATIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE WHICH MIGHT BE DESTABILIZING, AND WOULD ALSO GREATLY ENHANCE THE GOAL OF HALTING THE HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

III. SEABEDS ARMS CONTROL TREATY REVIEW CONFERENCE

-- THE USG BELIEVES THAT THE SBABED TREATY HAS FUNCTIONED EFFECTIVELY, AND ANTICIPATES THAT THE REVCON WILL COME TO THE SAME CONCLUSION.

-- SINCE THERE HAS NOT BEEN AND THERE IS LITTLE PROSPECT OF AN ARMS RACE ON THE SEABED AND BECAUSE SOME SEABED SYSTEMS ARE BEING TREATED IN SALT, THERE IS NO NEED TO CONCLUDE FURTHER ARMS CONTROL INSTRUMENTS IN RELATION TO THE SEABEDS, OR TO EXPAND THE SCOPE OF THE PRESENT TREATY.

-- THUS, WE SEE NO NEED TO AMEND THE TREATY AT THIS TIME. WE ARE, HOWEVER, PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY REASONABLE PROPOSALS, AND TO DISCUSS THE BEST WAY OF DEALING WITH THEM. IF ANY PARTIES HAVE SERIOUS PROPOSALS TO RAISE AT THE REVCON, IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR THEM TO GIVE AS MUCH ADVANCE NOTICE AS POSSIBLE.

-- THE USG WOULD LIKE TO ENSURE THAT LAW OF THE SEA ISSUES DO NOT INTRUDE INTO THE SEABED REVCON, AND THAT THE REVIEW PROCESS IS CARRIED OUT IN A BUSINESSLIKE AND ORDERLY WAY.

-- WE WOULD HOPE THAT FUTURE SEABED REVCONS WOULD ONLY BE HELD WHEN A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PARTIES CONSIDER SUCH A REVIEW NECESSARY. HOWEVER, IF THERE IS A STRONG DESIRE FOR A FIXED INTERVAL, WE WOULD PREFER A TEN YEAR PERIOD BETWEEN REVIEW CONFERENCES, AND CERTAINLY NO LESS CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 07 STATE 089099

THAN FIVE YEARS.

IV. CHEMICAL WEAPONS

-- THE U.S. IS CURRENTLY REVIEWING CW ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. WE EXPECT THIS REVIEW TO BE COMPLETED IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND, AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES, POSSIBLY TO PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A PROPOSAL TO THE U.S.S.R.

-- A SECOND ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS AT THE EXPERT LEVEL ON CW WAS HELD WITH THE RUSSIANS IN GENEVA DURING THE PERIOD APRIL 1 - APRIL 8. THESE CONSULTATIONS WERE PURSUANT TO THE AGREEMENT TO CONSIDER A JOINT INITIATIVE REACHED AT THE JULY 1974 SUMMIT, BUT THE US DEL WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS ON A TREATY. THE SOVIETS ARE CLEARLY IMPATIENT AND APPEAR ANXIOUS TO BEGIN PREPARING A JOINT INITIATIVE. THE TONE OF THE CONSULTATIONS WAS COURTEOUS AND BUSINESSLIKE.

-- THE CONSULTATIONS FOCUSED ON TECHNICAL QUESTIONS RELATED TO CW ARMS CONTROL, PARTICULARLY IN THE AREAS OF SCOPE OF PROHIBITION AND OF VERIFICATION. IN THIS RESPECT THE CONSULTATIONS REPRESENTED AN EXTENSION OF THE FIRST ROUND, WHICH WAS HELD IN AUGUST 1976.

-- LITTLE NEW GROUND WAS BROKEN IN THE CONSULTATIONS. BECAUSE OUR REVIEW HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETED, THE U.S. WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO PRESENT A PROPOSAL. FOR THEIR PART, THE SOVIETS REITERATED THEIR WELL-KNOWN VIEWS ON VERIFICATION AND MAINTAINED THEIR NEGATIVE POSITION ON TECHNICAL EXCHANGE VISITS. OVERALL, PROGRESS WAS SLIGHT.

-- DURING THE CONSULTATIONS, THE U.S. SUGGESTED THAT ANY JOINT INITIATIVE TAKE THE FORM OF AGREED KEY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 08 STATE 089099

ELEMENTS OF A CW AGREEMENT, RATHER THAN A DRAFT TREATY TEXT.(IF ASKED: THE PRELIMINARY REACTION OF THE SOVIET SIDE WAS THAT WHILE A FULL TREATY TEXT WAS NOT NECESSARILY REQUIRED, THEY PREFERRED TO HAVE THE KEY ELEMENTS IN TREATY LANGUAGE.)

-- IT WAS AGREED TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSIONS, ALTHOUGH NO DATE WAS SET. WE HAVE INDICATED TO THE SOVIETS THAT FURTHER DISCUSSIONS COULD BE HELD BEFORE THE CCD SUMMER SESSION, WHICH BEGINS JULY 5. THIS WILL HOWEVER DEPEND UPON THE STATE OF OUR REVIEW AND SUBSEQUENT CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES.

-- DURING SECRETARY VANCE'S RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW, IT WAS AGREED TO ESTABLISH A U.S. - SOVIET WORKING GROUP ON CW. NO DECISION HAS YET BEEN MADE ON HOW TO PROCEED WITH THIS GROUP, ALTHOUGH IT IS LIKELY THAT THIS GROUP WILL PROVIDE THE FORUM FOR CONTINUATION OF THE BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ALREADY UNDERWAY.

V. HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS (WEAPONS CAUSING UNNECESSARY SUFFERING OR HAVING INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS)

-- THE USG IS PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE'S AD HOC COMMITTEE ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ISSUES. HOWEVER, WE NOTE THAT ALL THE MAJOR POWERS ARE OPPOSED TO ANY ATTEMPT TO REACH AGREEMENT ON WEAPONS ISSUES IN THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE. FURTHER, THE COMMITTEE'S WORK SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO INTERFERE WITH THE HIGHER-PRIORITY WORK OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE COMPLETION OF THE TWO DRAFT PROTOCOLS TO THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS. IN ANY EVENT, WE DOUBT THERE IS SUFFICIENT TIME TO RESOLVE THE SUBSTANTIAL DIVERGENCE OF VIEWS AMONG CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS. HENCE, ALTHOUGH WE EXPECT THAT SOME OF THE NONALIGNED DELEGATIONS WILL PRESS FOR ADOPTION OF THEIR WEAPONS PROPOSALS DURING

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 09 STATE 089099

THIS SESSION OF THE LAWS OF WAR CONFERENCE, WE BELIEVE IT UNLIKELY THAT THESE PROPOSALS WILL BE ACTED UPON.

-- WE THEREFORE ANTICIPATE THAT THE ONLY RESULT OF THE CONFERENCE ON THESE QUESTIONS WILL BE A REPORT NOTING THE AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT, WHICH WILL BE FORWARDED TO GOVERNMENTS AND THE UNGA FOR CONSIDERATION OF FUTURE ACTION. WE WOULD SUPPORT THIS.

-- ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE VARIOUS PROPOSALS FOR WEAPONS RESTRICTIONS, THE US POSITION HAS NOT CHANGED SIGNIFICANTLY SINCE THE 3RD SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE. THE USG SUPPORTS REASONABLE RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF MINES AND BOOBY-TRAPS, ON THE USE OF INCENDIARY MUNITIONS IN POPULATED AREAS, AND ON MUNITIONS WHICH RELY FOR THEIR WOUNDING EFFECT ON NON-X-RAY DETECTABLE FRAGMENTS, BUT OPPOSES THE BROAD PROHIBITIONS PROPOSED BY THE SWEDES AND THE NON-ALIGNED.

-- WE HAVE AGREED TO THE MANDATE FOR A NATO STAFF STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF THE PROVISIONS ON MEANS AND METHODS OF WARFARE AND PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS CONTAINED IN PARTS III AND IV OF LOW DRAFT PROTOCOL I. HOWEVER, AS WE STATED IN POLADS ON APRIL 5, WE CONSIDER THE AUGUST 31 TARGET DATE FOR COMPLETION OF THE STUDY TO BE TENTATIVE, SUBJECT TO RECONSIDERATION ONCE THE LOW CONFERENCE CONCLUDES ITS WORK IN JUNE.

VI. NEW WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

-- WE RECOGNIZE THE DANGERS POSED BY WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION - EITHER NEW OR EXISTING - AND WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY PRACTICAL STEPS TOWARD OVERCOMING SUCH DANGERS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 10 STATE 089099

AA IN DISCUSSIONS OF NEW MDW IT IS ESSENTIAL TO MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS (FOR EXAMPLE THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION).

-- THE SOVIET APPROACH IS STILL A SINGLE, COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT PROHIBITING "NEW TYPES" AND "NEW SYSTEMS" OF MDW. WE BELIEVE EXPERIENCE SUGGESTS THAT DIVERSE NEW TYPES AND SYSTEMS OF WEAPONS WOULD REQUIRE SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO DEFINITION, SCOPE AND VERIFICATION, AND, THEREFORE, PROBABLY DISTINCT AGREEMENTS.

-- WE HAVE ENCOURAGED ACCEPTANCE OF THE 1948 UN DEFINITION OF MDW IN ORDER TO IMPOSE ON DISCUSSIONS THE 1948 COMPARABILITY STANDARD AS A BASIS FOR IDENTIFYING ANY NEW CANDIDATE WEAPON TYPE AS A WEAPON OF MASS DESTRUCTION. (NOTE: THE 1948 FORMULATION IS THAT AN MDW MUST, "HAVE CHARACTERISTICS COMPARABLE IN

DESTRUCTIVE EFFECT TO THOSE OF ATOMIC EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS, RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL WEAPONS, LETHAL CHEMICAL AND

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.")

-- WE HAVE AGREED WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO SET UP A WORKING GROUP ON RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (WHICH WE DO NOT HAVE). THE SOVIETS ASSOCIATE THIS TOPIC WITH THE CONCEPT OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. WE HAVE NOT YET REACHED AGREEMENT ON WHEN THIS WORKING GROUP WILL MEET.

VII. REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS

-- THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERS THE 1976 REPORT OF THE UNSYG'S BUDGETARY EXPERTS GROUP TO BE A CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE REPORTING STANDARDS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 11 STATE 089099

-- STANDARDIZED REPORTING OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES BY ALL NATIONS WOULD ENHANCE INTERNATIONAL CONFIDENCE AND WOULD REDUCE SECURITY FEARS.

-- THE METHODS OUTLINED IN THE STUDY FOCUS ATTENTION ON THE PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF THE QUESTION, WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAS SO FAR BEEN UNWILLING TO ADDRESS. WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE SOVIETS PARTICIPATE AND WILL CONTINUE TO URGE THEM TO DO SO,

-- DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE USE OF RESOURCES DERIVING FROM A MILITARY BUDGET AGREEMENT SHOULD AWAIT THE PREPARATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A UNIVERSAL, STANDARDIZED REPORTING SYSTEM WHICH CAN BE WORKED OUT IN THE PROCESS OF OPERATIONAL TESTING AND REFINEMENT.

-- SINCE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT IS LIKELY TO BE A MAJOR TOPIC AT THE SSOD, THE WESTERN ALLIES SHOULD FORMULATE A STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH IT. WE LOOK FAVORABLY ON THE OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF FORMULATIONS REGARDING REDUCTIONS OF MILITARY BUDGETS, BUT WE ARE OPPOSED TO A MECHANICAL LINKAGE BETWEEN SUCH REDUCTIONS AND INCREASES IN DEVELOPMENT AID.

VIII. REGIONAL ASPECTS OF DISARMAMENT: CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS

-- PRESIDENT CARTER HAS EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF BRINGING ABOUT A REDUCTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS.

-- THE FIRST STEP IN THIS PROCESS INVOLVES THE
DEVELOPMENT OF GREATER RESTRAINTS ON US ARMS EXPORT
POLICY.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 12 STATE 089099

-- THE NEXT STEP WILL INVOLVE AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR BETTER CONTROL OF THE
WORLD ARMS TRADE.

-- AT THE PRESIDENT'S DIRECTION A REVIEW OF US ARMS
TRANSFER POLICY HAS RECENTLY BEEN COMPLETED AS A BASIS
FOR PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS.

-- WE WILL BE DISCUSSING WITH ARMS SUPPLIERS AND
RECIPIENTS ANY NEW POLICIES ENUNCIATED BY THE PRESIDENT.

-- AS A RESULT OF SECRETARY VANCE'S TRIP TO MOSCOW,
A US-SOVIET WORKING GROUP ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS SALES
WILL BE ESTABLISHED.

-- WE WANT TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH YOU ON THE QUESTION
OF ARMS TRANSFER CONTROLS.

-- WE WOULD WELCOME SUGGESTIONS ON APPROPRIATE FORUMS
AND APPROACHES.

-- OF PARTICULAR INTEREST WOULD BE YOUR VIEWS ON:

A. THE MERITS OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OR
REGIONAL CONFERENCES DEVOTED SOLELY TO THE SUBJECT;

B. PERTINENT AREAS FOR COOPERATION WITHIN NATO;

. OTHER APPROACHES TO SUPPLIER COOPERATION;

C. HOW THE USSR MIGHT BEST BE BROUGHT INTO ARMS
SUPPLY RESTRAINT ARRANGEMENTS.

-- WE ARE AWARE OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS INVOLVED
IN ARMS TRANSFER RESTRAINT. WHAT TYPES OF ARMS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 13 STATE 089099

PRODUCTION AND MARKETING ARRANGEMENTS MIGHT INDUCE
GREATER COOPERATION AMONG ARMS SUPPLIER STATES?

-- THE COOPERATION OF ARMS RECIPIENTS WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO BE SOUGHT TO AVOID CHARGES OF DISCRIMINATION BY THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES. WHAT INCENTIVES MIGHT SUPPLIERS PROVIDE TO INDUCE RECIPIENTS TO REACH AGREEMENTS TO LIMIT THEIR ARMS IMPORTS ON A REGIONAL OR SUB-REGIONAL BASIS?

-- WE WOULD ALSO BE INTERESTED IN FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE BELGIAN PROPOSAL FOR A STUDY OF THE REGIONAL ASPECTS OF ARMS CONTROL.

IX. "OTHER BUSINESS," SOVIET PROPOSAL ON NON-USE OF FORCE

-- OUR VIEWS ON THE SOVIET NON-USE OF FORCE PROPOSAL HAVE NOT CHANGED SINCE LAST FALL'S UNGA SESSION. IT IS OUR OPINION THAT A NUF TREATY WOULD UNDERMINE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS, AND THAT ANY MODIFICATIONS OF THE UN CHARTER SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN PURSUANT TO THE AMENDMENT PROCEDURE PROVIDED THEREIN.

-- ORAL SOVIET ASSERTIONS THAT A NUF TREATY WOULD NOT PERTAIN TO LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND WOULD NOT RESTRICT THE RIGHT OF GOVERNMENTS TO RECOVER CONQUERED TERRITORIES BY FORCE, COULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF LEGITIMIZING CERTAIN ILLEGITIMATE USES OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

-- INSTEAD OF A FURTHER GLOSS ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, WHAT IS NEEDED IS GREATER WILL ON THE PART OF STATES TO HONOR EXISTING OBLIGATIONS, AS WELL AS GREATER COMMITMENT TO THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 14 STATE 089099

-- ALTHOUGH WE DOUBT THAT THE SOVIETS CAN BE PERSUADED TO FORGO PLENARY AND FIRST COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION OF THEIR PROPOSAL IN THIS FALL'S UNGA, THE WESTERN COUNTRIES SHOULD TRY TO ENSURE THAT IT GETS A THOROUGH AIRING IN THE SIXTH COMMITTEE, RESULTING IN A DETAILED EXAMINATION OF ITS LEGAL IMPLICATIONS. END TEXT.
VANCE UNQTE
VANCE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: INSTRUCTIONS, DISARMAMENT, ALLIANCE, POLICIES, COMMITTEE MEETINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 20-Apr-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE089099
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: MCONGDON
Enclosure: DG ALTERED PER TELCON MICHAEL CONGDON 4/26/77 ACDA/IR
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770138-0156
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770437/aaaabfmc.tel
Line Count: 1136
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: f907b1a1-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 21
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 13-Oct-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2745509
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: NATO DISARMAMENT EXPERTS APRIL 21-22: INSTRUCTIONS FOR USDEL
TAGS: PFOR, PARM, US, NATO
To: NATO BRUSSELS
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/f907b1a1-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009